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KANSAS v. PRAIRIE BAND POTA WATOMI NATION:
UNDERMINING INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH STATE
TAXATION
JESSE K. MARTIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Kansas v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation,1 the Supreme
Court undermined the historic and deeply-rooted sovereign status of
Indian tribes by focusing on a hyper-technical application of precedent
and ignoring the practical impact of the Kansas motor fuel tax. The
Court determined that the state tax, as applied to the Nation Station's
sale of gasoline and diesel fuel was nondiscriminatory, reversing the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Specifically,
the Court found that the application of the Kansas motor fuel tax was
imposed on an off-reservation transaction between non-Indians.
Focusing on the "who" and the "where" of the tax, the Court
rejected the application of the Bracker2 interest-balancing test. The
elements of the Bracker test "provide[] for a particularized inquiry into
the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake"3 to
determine "whether in the specific context, the exercise of state
authority would violate federal law" or "unlawfully infringe on the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them." 3  In Kansas v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, the Court
* J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Maryland School of Law; B.A., Sweet Briar
College. The author wishes to thank Mrs. Lisa Welsh for her contributions to the early drafts
of this paper.
1. 126 S. Ct. 676 (2005), reh'g denied, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 1058 (Jan. 23, 2006) (Prairie
III).
2. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (holding that the
Arizona state tax applied to non-Indians harvesting timber on a reservation is preempted by
federal law). In the Court's opinion, a rigid rule does not exist which addresses whether a
particular state law can be applied to an Indian reservation or its tribal members. See id. at
142. Consequently, the Court set forth an interest-balancing test to be applied only where, "a
State asserts authority over the conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity on the
reservation." Id. at 144. The interests that must be considered are those of the state, the
federal government, and the tribe. Accordingly, "[sitate jurisdiction is preempted by the
operation of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests
reflected in federal law, unless the State interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertions
of State authority." New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983).
3. Id.
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determined that this test does not apply to a tax levied in an off-
reservation transaction between non-Indians.4
While on its face, the Court's analysis may appear technically
in accordance with the law, the legal incidence of a tax, as well as the
location of the activity which triggers the tax, are events subject to
manipulation by the state legislature, a body that has a vested interest
in generating tax revenue. The bona fide fact that the off-reservation
imposition of the tax on the distributor affects tribal members, because
the distributor is economically forced to push the tax downstream,
highlights the inequities that exist in the prerequisites to the Bracker
interest-balancing test. The sovereignty of Indian tribes should not
rest upon such fragile, tenuous, and easily manipulated prerequisites.
Moving forward, courts should, at a minimum, apply the Bracker
interest-balancing test irrespective of a tax's legal incidence and
notwithstanding whether a tax arises as a result of on-reservation or
off-reservation activity, as these indicia are subject to manipulation
and are hardly determinative of a tax's ultimate impact.
II. THE CASE
The Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation (the Tribe) is a federally
recognized Indian tribe with its reservation located in Jackson County,
Kansas. 5 Pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 6 the Tribe
owns and operates a thirty-five million dollar casino on its reservation
near Mayetta, Kansas,7 which significantly increases the number of
people who travel to this otherwise remote area.
8
Nation Station, a convenience store and gas station owned and
operated by the Tribe on its reservation, is located near the casino.
9
Eleven of the Nation Station's fifteen employees are Indians and seven
of these employees are members of the Tribe. 10 Seventy-one percent
4. See Prairie II1, 126 S. Ct. at 687 (noting that "[1]imiting the interest-balancing test to
on-reservation transactions between a nontribal entity and a tribe or tribal member is
consistent with our unique Indian tax immunity jurisprudence").
5. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Kansas, 241 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1297 (Kan. 2003)
(Prairie I).
6. 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (2006).
7. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Kansas, 379 F.3d 979, 981 (10th Cir. 2004)
(Prairie II).
8. Id.
9. Prairie 1, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 1297.
10. Prairie 11, 379 F.3d at 981.
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of the Nation Station's proceeds are generated by its fuel sales."' The
Tribe imposes on these fuel sales a per-gallon tax of sixteen cents for
gasoline and eighteen cents for diesel fuel. 12 The Nation Station's fuel
sales provide the Tribe with its sole source of fuel tax revenue,
approximately $300,000 per year.13
The Tribe uses the revenue from the fuel tax collected at
Nation Station to construct and maintain roads and to provide critical
government services including, inter alia, law enforcement, fire
protection, emergency response, educational services, urban planning,
and court services. 14 Most importantly, however, the fuel tax revenue
pays for the maintenance of the roads and bridges that connect to the
reservation; this includes U.S. Highway 75, the road connecting to the
casino.1 5 The Tribe receives no financial assistance from the State of
Kansas to maintain this thoroughfare. 16
The gasoline and diesel fuel sold at the Nation Station are
imported from outside the reservation.17 Seventy-three percent of the
Nation Station's fuel sales are made to patrons and employees of the
casino.18 An additional eleven percent of the fuel sales are made to
people who live or work on the reservation. 19 That is, approximately
eighty-four percent of Nation Station's fuel sales come from
reservation activity and residents. Indeed, as the Tribe's expert
testified, the Nation Station is a location-dependent business because,
"but for the casino, there would not be enough traffic to support [the
station] in its current location." 20
Prior to May of 1995, the Kansas Department of Revenue did
not collect motor fuel taxes on fuel distributed on Indian lands. In
1995, however, the Kansas legislature amended the Kansas Motor Fuel
Tax Act, and the Department of Revenue began to impose taxes on
fuel distributed to Indian tribes on tribal land.21 The express structure
of the legislation places the legal incidence of the tax on the fuel
distributors; yet, the distributors are permitted to pass the tax along to
retailers like Nation Station, which distributors choose to do as a
11. Prairie 1, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Prairie 11, 379 F.3d at 982.
16. Id.
17. Prairie!, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 1297.
18. Prairie I, 379 F.3d at 982.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Prairie 1, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
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general business practice.22 Historically, however, the Nation Station
23has indisputably sold fuel at fair market prices. As a result, Nation
Station has never advertised an exemption from state fuel taxes.24 The
Tribe's expert concluded that "the Nation is not marketing a tax
exemption because the price of the fuel at the Nation Station is set
above cost, including the Nation's tax, and within two cents per gallon
of the price prevailing in the local market. '' 25  Thus, the Nation
Station's prices were competitive and comparable in all material
respects with the fuel prices charged by off-reservation stations, even
in the absence of the Kansas state fuel tax. 2 6
In response to the legislature's amendment to the Kansas
Motor Fuel Tax Act, the Tribe sued the State of Kansas for declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief from the collection of state fuel tax
27from distributors delivering fuel to the reservation. The primary
impetus behind the suit was the fact that the tribal fuel tax and the state
fuel tax are mutually exclusive, i.e., only one can be collected without
rendering the Nation Station's fuel prices uncompetitive. 28 To this
end, and as noted above, the Tribe uses the revenues generated from its
fuel tax to construct and maintain roads, bridges and related
infrastructure on the reservation without state assistance. In contrast,
Kansas spends none of its fuel tax revenue on the maintenance or
improvement of reservation roads owned by the Tribe.3
0
During the early stages of the litigation, both parties filed
motions for summary judgment. 31 The district court, applying the
Bracker test, granted the Department of Revenue's motion for
summary judgment noting that the balance of state, federal, and tribal
interests tilted in favor of the State of Kansas. 32 On appeal before the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the district court's decision
was reversed.33 The Tenth Circuit found that the Tribe's fuel revenues
were derived primarily from the Tribe's construction of the casino and
22. Id.
23. Prairie 11, 379 F.3d at 982.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See generally Prairie 1, 241 F. Supp. 2d 1295.
28. Prairie 111, 126 S. Ct. at 696 (Ginsburg & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 697 (Ginsburg & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
31. See Prairie 1, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 1297.
32. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
33. See generally Prairie H, 379 F.3d 979.
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the ensuing fuel market created by the development of tribal land.34
The Tenth Circuit also found that the revenues derived from the tribal
fuel tax were necessary to preserve and maintain the reservation's
infrastructure. 35 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit held that the Tribe's
sovereignty and federal interests against taxation outweighed the
State's general interest in raising revenue.36  The State of Kansas
petitioned for a writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court granted the State's petition to resolve two
threshold questions: first, to determine upon whom the legal incidence
of the tax is focused; and second, to decide whether Kansas may
impose a tax on a non-Indian distributor's off-reservation receipt of
fuel, which is subsequently passed on to tribal members, without
subjecting the tax to the Bracker interest-balancing test.37 The Court,
reversing the Tenth Circuit, determined that the legal incidence of the
Kansas tax is focused on the non-Indian distributors. 38 The Court also
decided that the lower courts improperly applied the Bracker interest-
balancing test, opining that notwithstanding the ultimate impact of the
tax on tribal members, the tax is triggered by the distributor's receipt
of fuel off the reservation. 39 Accordingly, the Court held that "the
Kansas motor fuel tax is a nondiscriminatory tax imposed on an off-
,40
reservation transaction between non-Indians. As such, the tax was
found to be "valid and [to] pose[] no affront to the Nation's
sovereignty., 41 The Court subsequently denied the Nation Station's
petition for rehearing.42
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The underlying legal conflict in this case between the State of
Kansas and the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation has historical roots in
34. See id. at 984 ("the Nation's fuel market does not exist because of a claimed state
tax exemption; rather, the Nation created a new fuel market by financing and building its
gaming facilities").
35. See id.
36. See id. at 987.
37. See Prairie 11I, 126 S. Ct. at 681.
38. See generally Prairie III, 126 S. Ct. 676 (2005), reh'g denied, 2006 U.S. LEXIS
1058 (Jan. 23, 2006).
39. Prairie 111, 126 S. Ct. at 686-89.
40. Id. at 689.
41. Id.
42. See Kansas v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 126 S. Ct. 1187 (2006) (denying
petition for rehearing).
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issues of tribal self-government, the Indian Commerce Clause, and the
Hayden-Cartwright Act, the latter of which is the legislation that gave
rise to the use of fuel taxes to support highway maintenance.
A. The Boundary Between State Regulatory Authority and Tribal
Self-Government
From its earliest days, the United States has recognized the
sovereign status of Indian tribes.43 Chief Justice Marshall's view was
that "the laws of [a state could] have no force" within reservation
boundaries. 4  While Justice Marshall's view is not strictly applied
today, traditional notions of Indian self-government are nevertheless
deeply engrained in our jurisprudence, and as a result provide an
important "backdrop" 45 with respect to conflicts arising between
Indian tribes and the state in which they reside. The courts have also
recognized that Indian tribes "retain attributes of sovereignty over both
their members and their territory. ' 46 The status of Indian tribes has
been described as
an anomalous one and of complex character, for despite
their partial assimilation into American culture, the
tribes have retained a semi-independent position ... not
as states, not as nations, not as possessed of the full
attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with
the power of regulating their internal and social
relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the
Union or of the State within whose limits they
resided.47
Therefore, Indian tribes, such as the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation,
have traditionally been recognized as self-governing and generally not
subject to the laws of the state in which they reside.
43. See Cherokee v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
44. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 520 (1832).
45. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143.
46. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1979).
47. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1959).
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B. The Indian Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution
Despite the tradition of Indian self-government, however, the
federal government does retain some power with respect to certain
issues involving Indian tribes. The Indian Commerce Clause grants
Congress broad power to regulate affairs between the United States
and Indian tribes, including affairs concerning tribal lands.48
Specifically, the Constitution provides that, "[t]he Congress shall have
power.., to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes. However, pursuant to the
Court's holding in Bracker, when a federal preemption analysis is
applied to a state's assertion of authority over the conduct of non-
Indians engaging in activity on an Indian reservation, courts must
assess how state sovereignty differs from that of tribal sovereignty,
5 0
Conversely, when "the legal incidence [of a state tax] rests on a tribe
or on tribal members for sales made inside Indian country, the tax
cannot be enforced absent clear congressional authorization.
51
C. The Hayden-Cartwright Act
The Hayden-Cartwright Act of 1936,52 enacted in part under
the Indian Commerce Clause, is the historical authority for the Kansas
motor fuel tax. In relevant part, the Hayden-Cartwright Act provides:
All tax[es] levied by any State, Territory, or the District
of Columbia upon, with respect to, or measured by,
sales, purchases, storage, or use of gasoline or other
48. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (the "'central function of the Indian
Commerce Clause ... is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of
Indian affairs"') (quoting Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989));
see also Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of N.M., 458 U.S. 832, 837
(1982) ("broad power" to regulate matters between the United States and Indian sovereigns
under the Indian Commerce Clause); Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142 (same).
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; but cf Lara, 541 U.S. at 224 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(Justice Thomas noting that he cannot agree that the Indian Commerce Clause "'provide[s]
Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs."') (quoting Cotton
Petroleum Corp., 490 U.S. at 192). Justice Thomas continued that "[a]t one time, the
implausibility of [the majority's] assertion at least troubled the Court." Lara, 541 U.S. at 224
(Thomas, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1886)
(noting that such a construction is "very strained")). Justice Thomas then suggests that the
Court revisit the question. Lara, 541 U.S. at 224 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-93 (1995)).
50. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143.
51. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 459 (1995).
52. Hayden-Cartwright Act, 4 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1936).
2006] 257
258 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS
motor vehicle fuels may be levied, in the same manner
and to the same extent, with respect to such fuels when
sold by or through post exchanges, ship stores, ship
service stores, commissaries, filling stations, licensed
traders, and other similar agencies, located on United
States military or other reservations, when such fuels
are not for the exclusive use of the United States. Such
taxes, so levied, shall be paid to the proper taxing
authorities of the State . . . within whose border the
reservation may be located.53
While the Hayden-Cartwright Act is a by-product of the Federal
Highway Act of 1916,54 which provided for rural road construction,
the Hayden-Cartwright Act failed to designate funds for road
maintenance and gave rise to the use of fuel taxes, among other taxes,
to support such maintenance. 55 Interestingly, courts and commentators
alike have opined that it is unclear whether the language of the
Hayden-Cartwright Act was intended to address or encroach upon
Indian reservations. 56 One such commentator has noted:
Given the limited and often contradictory evidence
surrounding the passage and purposes of the Hayden-
Cartwright Act, it is impossible to state with any
certainty that the Act was designed with the intention of
providing the express congressional authorization
necessary to enable a state to impose the tax incidence
directly on the tribal retailer selling on tribal-owned
land within the reservation boundaries. 5
7
53. Id.
54. Act of July 11, 1916, ch. 241, 39 Stat. 355, repealed by 23 U.S.C. §§ 101,
202, 204, 205 (1999).
55. Karen L. Spinola, The Road Less Traveled-Implications of the Goodman Oil
Decision, 38 IDAHo L. REV. 637, 646 (2002) (citing Frank C. Moore, The State's
Responsibility for State-Local Action, Financing Highways Symposium Conducted by the Tax
Institute, 72-73 (Nov. 8-9, 1957)).
56. See Bracker, 448 U.S. at 151 ("We agree with petitioners that the Hayden-
Cartwright Act, which authorizes state taxes 'on United States military or other reservations,'
was not designed to overcome the otherwise pre-emptive effect of federal regulation of tribal
timber. We need not reach the more general question whether the Hayden-Cartwright Act
applies to Indian reservations at all."); see also Spinola, 38 IDAHO L. REV. at 646 ('The
pertinent question is whether Indian reservations were intended to be included in the phrase
'military or other reservations."').
57. Spinola, 38 IDAHO L. REV. at 655.
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D. The Interest-Balancing Approach
Congressional authority and the semi-autonomous nature of
Indian tribes have given rise to two independent but related barriers to
the assertion of state regulatory authority over tribal reservations and
members. First, federal law may preempt the exercise of such
authority. 59 Second, the exercise of such authority may unlawfully
infringe "on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them." 6° Thus, courts have sought to balance the
federal, state, and tribal interests involved.
Specifically, the interest-balancing test is applied to evaluate
claims that state taxes levied on non-Indians should be preempted
because they undermine tribal and federal interests. 6 1  This test,
58. See Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc., 458 U.S. at 836-37 (citing McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973) and Warren Trading Post Co. v.
Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965)); see also Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361-62
(2001) ("Our cases make clear that the Indians' right to make their own laws and be governed
by them does not exclude all state regulatory authority on the reservation. State sovereignty
does not end at a reservation's border. Though tribes are often referred to as 'sovereign'
entities, it was 'long ago' that the Court departed from Chief Justice Marshall's view that 'the
laws of [a State] can have no force' within reservation boundaries. Worcester, 6 Peters at
561" (citing Bracker, 448 U.S. at 141)). See also Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362 ("That is not to say
that States may exert the same degree of regulatory authority within a reservation as they do
without. To the contrary, the principle that Indians have the right to make their own laws and
be governed by them requires 'an accommodation between the interests of the Tribes and the
Federal Government, on the one hand, and those of the State, on the other.' Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156 (1980); see also id. at 181
(opinion of Rehnquist, J.).").
59. See Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143 (citing Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. 685;
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 165); see also Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144 ("When on-reservation
conduct involving only Indians is at issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the State's
regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and the federal interest in encouraging tribal self-
government is at its strongest.").
60. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
61. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1989),
providing:
[Q]uestions of pre-emption in this area are not resolved by reference to
standards of preemption that have developed in other areas of the law, and
are not controlled by "mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal
sovereignty." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracket, 448 U.S. 136,
145 (1980). Instead, we have applied a flexible pre-emption analysis
sensitive to the particular facts and legislation involved. Each case
"requires a particularized examination of the relevant state, federal, and
tribal interests." Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of
New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832, 838 (1982). Moreover, in examining the pre-
emptive force of the relevant federal legislation, we are cognizant of both
the broad policies that underlie the legislation and the history of tribal
independence in the field at issue .... Finally, we note that although state
interests must be given weight and courts should be careful not to make
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however, applies only where a state asserts authority over the conduct
of non-Indians engaging in activity on a reservation.
62
For example, the Court in White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker63 addressed the question of whether a state should be
preempted from collecting otherwise lawful taxes from non-Indians in
view of the burden consequently imposed upon a tribe or its
members. 64  In Bracker, Arizona sought to enforce its fuel-use and
vehicle-license taxes against a non-Indian enterprise that contracted
with the White Mountain Apache Tribe to harvest timber from
reservation lands.65  There, the Court was called upon to determine
66whether the taxes formally imposed on non-Indians were preempted.
The Court instructed that the analysis should not rely upon
"mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but
[calls] for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal,
and tribal interests at stake." The articulated purpose of this inquiry
is to determine "whether in the specific context, the exercise of state
authority would violate federal law" or "unlawfully infringe on the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
legislative decisions in the absence of congressional action, ambiguities in
federal law are, as a rule, resolved in favor of tribal independence.
Cotton Petroleum Corp., 490 U.S. at 176-77.
62. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144-45, stating:
When on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at issue,
state law is generally inapplicable, for the State's regulatory interest is
likely to be minimal and the federal interest in encouraging tribal self-
government is at its strongest. See Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425
U.S. 463, 480-81 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n.
More difficult questions arise where, as here, a State asserts authority over
the conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity on the reservation. In
such cases we have examined the language of the relevant federal treaties
and statutes in terms of both the broad policies that underlie them and the
notions of sovereignty that have developed from historical traditions of
tribal independence. This inquiry is not dependent on mechanical or
absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but has called for a
particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal
interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific
context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law.
Compare Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685
(1965) and Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) with Moe v. Salish &
Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) and Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264
(1898). Cf McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. at 171;
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. at 148.
Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144-45.
63. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
64. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145-46.
65. Id. at 139-40.
66. Id. at 137-38.
67. Id. at 145.
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them.",68 In Bracker, the Court concluded that "the proposed exercise
of state authority [was] impermissible" because "it [was] undisputed
that the economic burden of the asserted taxes [would] ultimately fall
on the Tribe, the Federal Government ha[d] undertaken comprehensive
regulation of the harvesting and sale of tribal timber," and state
officials were "unable to justify the taxes except in terms of a
generalized interest in raising revenue." 69 Thus, in Bracker, the Court
found that the state was not permitted to tax non-Indians where the
economic burden of the tax ultimately fell on the tribe.
However, in situations in which a state is asserting its taxing
authority off the reservation, a completely different approach, based on
the Court's determination in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones70 has
been utilized. Rather than applying the interest-balancing test in those
situations, the courts have uniformly permitted the taxation of off-
reservation activity, noting that "absent express federal law to the
contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries [are] held
subject to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all
citizens of the state.",
71
IV. SUMMARY OF THE COURT'S REASONING
In Kansas v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation,72 the Court
reversed the decision of the Tenth Circuit73 and determined that the
Kansas motor fuel tax, as applied to the Nation Station's sale of
gasoline and diesel fuel, is a nondiscriminatory tax imposed on an off-
reservation transaction between non-Indians.74 In so holding, the
Court rejected the application of the Bracker75 interest-balancing test,
noting that the test does not apply to a tax resulting from an alleged
off-reservation transaction between non-Indians.76
The Court began its analysis by setting forth the legal
framework necessary to evaluate the validity of the Kansas fuel tax.
The Court prefaced its discussion by noting that the "who" and the
68. Id. at 142.
69. Id. at 151.
70. 441 U.S. 145 (1973) (permitting the taxation of the gross receipts of an off-
reservation, Indian-owned ski resort).
71. Mescalero Apache, 441 U.S. at 148-49.
72. 126 S. Ct. 676 (2005), reh'g denied, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 1058 (Jan. 23, 2006).
73. See id. at 688 (reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals).
74. Id.
75. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
76. Prairie III, 126 S. Ct. at 688.
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"where" of the challenged tax have "significant consequences." 77
Indeed, the Court stated that it had previously "determined that 'the
initial and frequently dispositive question in Indian tax cases . . . is
who bears the legal incidence of [the] tax.'78 In this regard, the Court
was cognizant of the fact that "states are categorically barred from
placing the legal incidence of an excise tax 'on a tribe or on tribal
members for sales made inside Indian country' without congressional
authorization. 79 The Court acknowledged, however, that "even when
a state imposes the legal incidence of its tax on a non-Indian seller, the
tax may nonetheless be preempted if the transaction giving rise to tax
liability occurs on the reservation and the imposition of the tax fails to
satisfy the Bracker interest-balancing test." 80
Applying this legal framework to the Kansas motor fuel tax,
the Court determined that the legal incidence of the tax falls on the
fuel distributors, rather than on the Tribe. 81 The Court noted that the
express language of the statute "specifies that 'the incidence of [the
motor fuel] tax is imposed on the distributor of the first receipt of the
motor fuel,"' and is therefore determinative of the issue.82 Continuing
its analysis, the Court reasoned that, notwithstanding the express
language of the statute, it would have nevertheless concluded that the
legal incidence of the tax falls on the distributor. 83  The Court
evaluated section 79-3410(a) of the Kansas statute and found that the
"distributor, rather than the retailer. .. is liable to pay the motor fuel
tax.'84  That subsection provides, in relevant part, that "every
distributor ... shall compute and shall pay to the director . . . the
77. Id. at 681.
78. Id. (citing Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 458).
79. Prairie II, 126 S. Ct. at 681 (citing Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 458).
80. Prairie III, 126 S. Ct. at 681.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 682 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3408(c)).
83. Prairie III, 126 S. Ct. at 681-82.
84. Id. at 682. Section 79-3410(a) provides:
Every distributor, manufacturer, importer, exporter or retailer of
motor-vehicle fuels or special fuels, on or before the 25th day of each
month, shall render to the director ...a report certified to be true and
correct showing the number of gallons of motor-vehicle fuels or special
fuels received by such distributor, manufacturer, importer, exporter or
retailer during the preceding calendar month . . . . Every distributor,
manufacturer or importer within the time herein fixed for the rendering of
such reports, shall compute and shall pay to the director at the director's
office the amount of taxes due to the state on all motor-vehicle fuels or
special fuels received by such distributor, manufacturer or importer during
the preceding calendar month.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3410(a).
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amount of [motor fuel] taxes due to the state." 85 While the Court
noted that distributors are entitled to pass the cost of the tax
downstream, 8 6 it found that they are not required to do so and
dispensed with the issue.
87
The Tribe argued that the Court must apply the Bracker
interest-balancing test "irrespective of the identity of the taxpayer...
because the Kansas motor fuel tax arises as a result of the on-
reservation sale and delivery of the motor fuel.",88 The Tribe found
support for its position in section 79-3408(a), which provides that "[a]
tax . . . is hereby imposed on the use, sale or delivery of all motor
vehicle fuels or special fuels which are used, sold or delivered in this
state for any purpose whatsoever." 89  The Tribe claimed further
support in section 79-3408(d), which "permits distributors to obtain
deductions from the Kansas motor fuel tax for certain post-receipt
transactions, such as the sale or delivery of fuel for export from the
state and sale or delivery of fuel to the United States." The Tribe
contended that because this subsection indicates that a final tax
liability cannot be determined until after the downstream sale, "the
taxable event is actually the distributor's post-receipt delivery of fuel
to retailers, such as the [Nation Station], rather than the distributors'
initial receipt of the fuel."91  Finally, and similar to its previous
argument, the Tribe maintained its interpretation was consistent with
section 79-3417, which permits a refund for destroyed fuel, again
focusing on the lack of finality absent a downstream sale.9
2
The Court, however, concluded that a fair interpretation of the
Kansas statute, confirms that the Tribe's interpretation was devoid of
merit.93 The "use, sale or delivery" language pointed to by the Nation,
in the Court's opinion, refers to the sale or delivery of the fuel to the
distributor that triggered the tax liability.94 The Court further opined
that sections 79-3408(d) and 79-3417 do not change the nature of the
taxable event (i.e., the distributor's receipt of the fuel), as set forth in
the statute, and that this is highlighted by the fact that a distributor
85. Prairie III, 126 S. Ct. at 681-82.
86. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3409.
87. Prairie III, 126 S. Ct. at 681.
88. Id. at 683.
89. Id. at 684.
90. Id. at 685.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 686.
93. Prairie II, 126 S. Ct. at 686.
94. Id.
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must pay the tax even if the fuel is held in inventory and not
subsequently resold.95
Finding that the incidence of the Kansas motor fuel tax is
imposed on the non-Indian distributors and, thus, on activity occurring
off the reservation, the Court disagreed with the Tenth Circuit's
application of the Bracker interest-balancing test.96 The Court noted
that the test in Bracker was formulated "to address the 'difficult
question' that arises when 'a state asserts authority over the conduct of
non-Indians engaging in activity on the reservation. ''97 Thus, the
Bracker interest-balancing test "has never been applied where, as here,
the state asserts its taxing authority over non-Indians off the
reservation." 98 Rather, the Court has only applied the test "where 'the
legal incidence of the tax fell on a non-tribal entity engaged in a
transaction with tribes or tribal members' on the reservation.99 The
Court reasoned that "[1]imiting the interest-balancing test exclusively
to on-reservation transactions between a nontribal entity and a tribe or
tribal member is consistent with . . . . Indian tax immunity
jurisprudence," which relies "heavily on the doctrine of tribal
sovereignty ... [and confers] state law 'no role to play' within a
tribe's territorial boundaries."'
1°
By contrast, the Court noted that it has taken a completely
different approach with respect to a state asserting its taxing authority
off the reservation. In such situations, the Court has not applied the
interest-balancing test and has permitted the taxation of the off-
reservation activity or business, even if Indian-owned.'' The Court
reasoned that "absent express federal law to the contrary, Indians
going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject
to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of
the state."' 0 2 Accordingly, the Court found that "[i]f a state may apply
a nondiscriminatory tax to Indians who have gone beyond the
boundaries of the reservation, then it follows that it may apply a
nondiscriminatory tax where, as here, the tax is imposed on non-
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Prairie I11, 126 S. Ct. at 686 (citing Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144-45).
98. Prairie 111, 126 S. Ct. at 686.
99. Id. (quoting Arizona Dep't of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 526 U.S. 32, 37
(1999)).
100. Prairie II1, 126 S. Ct. at 687 (quoting Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508
U.S. 114, 123-24 (1993)).
101. Prairie III, 126 S. Ct. at 688 (citing Mescalero Apache, 441 U.S. 145 (permitting the
taxation of the gross receipts of an off-reservation, Indian-owned ski resort)).
102. Prairie II1, 126 S. Ct. at 688 (quoting Mescalero Apache, 441 U.S. at 148-49).
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Indians as a result of an off-reservation transaction."'10 3 The Court also
determined that application of the interest-balancing test to such off-
reservation transactions is inconsistent with efforts to establish "bright-
line standards" in the context of tax administration. Thus, the
application of the Bracker test "only clouds" judicial efforts to
establish such standards. 
104
Finally, the Court found that the Tribe is not entitled to interest
balancing by reason of its claim that the Kansas motor fuel tax and the
Tribe's fuel tax are mutually exclusive.10 5 The Court interpreted the
Tribe's claim as "ultimately a complaint about the downstream
economic consequences of the Kansas tax.'" ° 6 The Court believed that
whether the revenues generated by the Nation Station are deemed to be
"profits" or "tax proceeds," the Nation Station is simply "seek[ing] to
increase . . . revenues by purchasing untaxed fuel."'107 The Court
found, however, that decreased revenues could not be invoked as a
basis to invalidate the Kansas tax.1
0 8
In light of the foregoing, the Court held that the Kansas motor
fuel tax "is a nondiscriminatory tax imposed on an off-reservation
transaction between non-Indians" and, thus, "is valid and poses no
affront to the Nation's sovereignty."' 10
9
V. ANALYSIS
While the Court's opinion, at first glance, may seem rational in
light of binding precedent, the decision impermissibly ignores the
importance of Indian sovereignty. In determining whether to apply the
Bracker interest-balancing test, the Court, ostensibly following its
prior decisions, looked to the "who" and the "where" of the challenged
tax. However, the Kansas legislature, and, after this opinion, the
legislatures of every state in the Union, have grown wise to the
malleable requisites analyzed by the Court in determining whether
interest-balancing is necessary for tax legislation that impacts Indian
sovereignty. The sovereignty of the Tribe, as well as other Indian
nations, should not be dependent upon such fragile and tenuous
103. Prairie I1, 126 S. Ct. at 688.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Prairie 111, 126 S. Ct. at 688.
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elements, which are subject to state manipulation. Instead, the Court
should have recognized the apparent avenues of circumvention
available to the Kansas legislature with respect to its fuel tax and,
therefore, retreated from a hyper-technical application of precedent
and employed the Bracker interest-balancing test. Indeed,
prospectively, courts should, at a minimum, apply the Bracker interest-
balancing test, irrespective of a tax's legal incidence and
notwithstanding whether a tax arises as a result of on-reservation or
off-reservation activity. As demonstrated by the Kansas legislature,
these indicia are subject to manipulation and are hardly determinative
of a tax's ultimate impact.
A. The Court Failed to Distinguish Precedent
As a preamble to the principal analysis, the doctrine of stare
decisis does not prohibit the Court from deviating from precedent.
Stare decisis binds courts only to the actual holdings of the relevant
precedential decisions. Issues or questions which are "neither brought
to the attention of the court, nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as
having been so decided as to constitute precedent." 10 Accordingly,
analogous cases may not receive the same treatment if the issues raised
in the later case were not specifically decided in the former case."1
Previously, the Court has not been confronted with a situation in which
a state legislature intentionally manipulated a statute to avoid judicial
scrutiny and increase tax revenues at the expense of Indians engaged
in on-reservation activities. As such, the Court's reliance on a
decision such as Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,112 which does not
involve intentional manipulation or circumvention of the law, was
unfounded.
Moreover, even if the Court were to determine that decisions
such as Mescalero Apache have stare decisis effect, it could have,
nevertheless, exercised its discretion to deviate from this line of
precedent given the unique circumstances of the case. The Court is
not "absolutely bound by stare decisis" and may "consider any
substantial argument for overruling a previous decision."1 1 3 Indeed,
the Court has found that stare decisis is not "an inexorable command,"
110. Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925).
111. 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 134.04(5) (3d ed.
1999).
112. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
113. 18 MOORE, supra note 111, at § 134.02(1)(a).
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but rather is a principle of policy that does not have to be applied
unyieldingly. 114  Consequently, the Court was free to examine the
issues raised by Nation Station from a new perspective, namely with
an eye towards potential manipulation and circumvention of the law.
B. The Manipulation of the Bracker Prerequisites
Turning to the principal discussion, the Court wholly failed to
recognize the inequities that prevailed in its determination that the
Bracker interest-balancing test was not implicated by the Kansas
motor fuel tax. There is no dispute that when "the legal incidence of a
tax ... rests on a tribe or on tribal members for sales made inside
Indian country, the tax cannot be enforced absent clear congressional
authorization.'" 5 Nor is there any dispute that the Bracker interest-
balancing test should be applied when a state imposes the legal
incidence of its tax on a non-Indian seller and the transaction gives rise
to tax liability which occurs on the reservation. The precedent
established by the Court with respect to the Kansas motor fuel tax,
however, provides authority for courts to dispense with the Bracker
test where the malleable prerequisites of the test are not precisely met
and, indeed, provides a roadmap for other states to circumvent Indian
sovereignty in the name of tax revenue. Such precedent not only
raises sovereignty concerns, but also implicitly condones artfully
drafted legislation specifically designed to circumvent judicial
precedent.
The prerequisites to the application of the Bracker test, as
noted above, are: (1) that the legal incidence of the state's tax must
focus on a non-Indian seller; and (2) that the transaction must give rise
to tax liability that occurs on the reservation. The Kansas legislature,
keenly aware of the Bracker prerequisites, as well as the Court's
determination in Chickasaw Nation, amended its motor fuel tax
statute in 2003 to state that "the incidence of this tax is imposed on the
distributor."'117 In Chickasaw Nation, the Court determined that "if a
State is unable to enforce a tax because the legal incidence of the
impost is on Indians or Indian tribes, the State generally is free to
114. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (19 9 1).
115. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450,459 (1995).
116. See generally Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450.
117. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3408(c) (2003 Cum. Supp.); see also Prairie III, 126 S.
Ct. at 693 (Ginsburg & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
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amend its law to shift the tax's legal incidence." 118 In this respect,
other commentators have stated:
Taking note of the United States Supreme Court's
equivocal language in Chickasaw Nation, the Kansas
Legislature quickly acted to amend the Kansas fuel tax
statutes. The Kansas fuel tax has been imposed as
broadly as possible on the "use, sale or delivery of all
motor vehicle fuels or special fuels which are used, sold
or delivered in this State for any purpose whatsoever."
The linchpin of the new statutory scheme was the
statutory placement of the legal incidence of the fuel
tax on the "distributor of the first receipt." This
provision, as suggested by the Chickasaw Nation court,
makes issues of preemption and Indian sovereignty
inapplicable to the Kansas fuel tax. The Kansas statutes
also place the burden of collecting the tax on fuel
distributors. Distributors are, however, given the right
to pass the tax on to retailers as part of their selling
price. 119
Thus, the Court's reliance on the legal incidence of the challenged tax
and the related locale in which the transaction gives rise to tax liability
is conceptually unsound and vulnerable to manipulation.
To this end, the dissent of Justices Ginsburg and Kennedy
notes that "Kansas' placement of the legal incidence of the fuel tax is
not as clear and certain as the State of Kansas suggests and the Court
holds."' 2 0 The dissent argues that while the express language of the
statute is clear with respect to the legal incidence of the tax, the same
statute "declares initially that the tax 'is hereby imposed on the use,
sale or delivery of all motor vehicle fuels. .. used, sold or delivered in
this state for any purpose whatsoever,"'" 2 1 and it authorizes
distributors to pass on the tax to retailers.122 In addition, the dissent
notes that the statute excludes from taxation several transactions, such
as those for exportation from the state, those to the United States, and
118. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 460.
119. Luke R. Spellmeier, A Winning Hand or Time to Fold? State Taxation of Fuel Sales
on Kansas Indian Reservations, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 141, 144-45 (2003).
120. Prairie II1, 126 S. Ct. at 691 (Ginsburg & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
121. Id. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3408(a)).
122. Id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-3408(c), 79-3408(a), and 79-3409).
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lost or destroyed fuel. 123  Accordingly, the dissent concludes that
"[t]hese provisions indicate... that the Kansas Legislature anticipated
that distributors would shift the tax burden further downstream"'
124
and, thus, that the Kansas motor fuel tax is "effectively [imposed] only
on fuel actually resold by the distributors to an in-state nonexempt
purchaser" (i.e., to the tribe or tribal members).125
Consequently, the prerequisites to the Bracker interest-
balancing test lack meaningful substance. These prerequisites are
easily manipulated by state legislatures and should not be relied upon
to protect the sovereignty of Indian tribes. To do so, particularly in
instances in which the relevant statute is specifically amended to
circumvent the Indian Commerce clause, would significantly diminish
the notion of Indian sovereignty.
C. An Alternative Approach
The Court, however, had an alternative avenue to analyze the
Kansas motor fuel tax, while still staying within the ambit of its settled
precedent. Specifically, the Court has recognized elsewhere that the
legal incidence inquiry need not be determinative; rather, the practical
and real impact must be considered. Indeed, in Ramah Navajo School
Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico,126 the Court, for all
intents and purposes, conceded to the susceptibility of the legal
incidence inquiry, declining to allow a state to impose tax burdens on
Indian-run educational institutions, "even if those burdens [were]
imposed indirectly through a tax on a non-Indian contractor for work
done on the reservation."' 127 Elaborating on this determination, the
Court found that, in some contexts, the legal incidence of the tax
falling on a non-Indian is insignificant.' 28 What is significant, in the
Court's opinion, is "that the economic burden of the asserted tax
would ultimately fall on the Tribe, even though the legal incidence of
the tax was on [a] non-Indian . . . ." The Court's determination in
Ramah Navajo was further supported by the fact that the "state's
ultimate justification for imposing the tax amount[ed] to nothing more
123. Id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-3408(d) and 79-3417).
124. Prairie 111, 126 S. Ct. 691-92.
125. Id. at 691.
126. 458 U.S. 832, 844 (1982).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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than a general desire to increase revenues. ' 3  Accordingly, the
Court's statement in the Prairie Band case, namely that the Bracker
interest-balancing test "has never been applied where, as here, the state
asserts its taxing authority over non-Indians off the reservation,"1 31 is
not entirely accurate.
Moreover, the facts at issue here are exactly what the Bracker
interest-balancing test was designed to evaluate. In particular, the
inquiry was "designed to determine whether, in the specific context,
the exercise of state authority would violate federal law, ' 32 or
"unlawfully infringe 'on the right of the reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them." ' 133 In the Prairie Band case,
the competing interests were, on the one hand, the state's authority to
tax fuel sales at the Nation Station and, on the other, the Tribe's right
to tax the same transaction. As set forth in the dissent of Justices
Ginsburg and Kennedy, the Court has previously stated that "the
power to tax [is] an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty . ..a
necessary instrument of self-government and territorial
management, ,,134 which "enables a tribal government to raise revenues
for its essential services. ' 35 The fact that the tribal fuel tax and the
state fuel tax are mutually exclusive, i.e., only one can be collected
without rendering the Nation Station's fuel prices uncompetitive,
should have signaled to the Court the need for interest-balancing in
this case. Thus, going forward, courts should, at a minimum, apply the
Bracker interest-balancing test regardless of the tax's legal incidence
and notwithstanding the location of the activity that gives rise to the
tax.
VI. CONCLUSION
State taxes are limited in their applicability to Indian tribes by
both federal preemption and tribal self-governance, principles of
independence which typify our country's founding. In Kansas v.
130. Id. at 845.
131. Prairie 111, 126 S. Ct. at 686.
132. Id. at 690 (citing Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145) (Ginsburg & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
133. Prairie I1, 126 S. Ct. at 690 (quoting Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142) (Ginsburg &
Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
134. Prairie 111, 126 S. Ct. at 690 (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 445 U.S. 130,
137 (1982)) (Ginsburg & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
135. Prairie 111, 126 S. Ct. at 690 (citing Merrion, 445 U.S. at 130) (Ginsburg &
Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
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Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 36 the Court erroneously allowed the
State of Kansas to impose a motor fuel tax indirectly on the Nation
Station, an on-reservation retailer. Focusing on the technical elements
of legal incidence and the location of the activity that gave rise to the
tax, the Court allowed the State of Kansas to circumvent and
manipulate the law and consequently collect its own revenue at the
expense of tribal tax revenues. To properly analyze the Kansas motor
fuel tax or, more appropriately, the Kansas legislature's intentional
evasion of legal precedent, the Court should have applied the Bracker
interest-balancing test to the tax. In addition, to preserve Indian
sovereignty, courts should prospectively utilize the Bracker interest-
balancing test irrespective of a tax's legal incidence and
notwithstanding whether a tax arises as a result of on-reservation or
off-reservation activity, as these indicia are subject to manipulation
and are hardly determinative of a tax's ultimate impact.
136. See Prairie III, 126 S. Ct. 676 (2005), reh'g denied, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 1058 (Jan.
23, 2006).
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